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Server IP : 10.254.12.21  /  Your IP : 10.254.12.21
Web Server : Apache/2.4.6 (CentOS) OpenSSL/1.0.2k-fips PHP/5.6.40
System : Linux arit.skru.ac.th 3.10.0-1160.76.1.el7.x86_64 #1 SMP Wed Aug 10 16:21:17 UTC 2022 x86_64
User : apache ( 48)
PHP Version : 5.6.40
Disable Function : NONE
MySQL : ON  |  cURL : ON  |  WGET : OFF  |  Perl : ON  |  Python : ON  |  Sudo : ON  |  Pkexec : ON
Directory :  /usr/lib/sysctl.d/

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Current File : /usr/lib/sysctl.d/10-default-yama-scope.conf
# When yama is enabled in the kernel it might be used to filter any user
# space access which requires PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH like ptrace attach, access
# to /proc/PID/{mem,personality,stack,syscall}, and the syscalls
# process_vm_readv and process_vm_writev which are used for interprocess
# services, communication and introspection (like synchronisation, signaling,
# debugging, tracing and profiling) of processes.
#
# Usage of ptrace attach is restricted by normal user permissions. Normal
# unprivileged processes cannot interact through ptrace with processes
# that they cannot send signals to or processes that are running set-uid
# or set-gid.
#
# yama ptrace scope can be used to reduce these permissions even more.
# This should normally not be done because it will break various programs
# relying on the default ptrace security restrictions. But can be used
# if you don't have any other way to separate processes in their own
# domains. A different way to restrict ptrace is to set the selinux
# deny_ptrace boolean. Both mechanisms will break some programs relying
# on the ptrace system call and might force users to elevate their
# priviliges to root to do their work.
#
# For more information see Documentation/security/Yama.txt in the kernel
# sources. Which also describes the defaults when CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
# is enabled in a kernel build (currently 1 for ptrace_scope).
#
# This runtime kernel parameter can be set to the following options:
# (Note that setting this to anything except zero will break programs!)
#
# 0 - Default attach security permissions.
# 1 - Restricted attach. Only child processes plus normal permissions.
# 2 - Admin-only attach. Only executables with CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
# 3 - No attach. No process may call ptrace at all. Irrevocable.
#
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 0

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